

TANZANIA GENDER NETWORKING PROGRAMME (TGNP)

ANNUAL GENDER STUDIES CONFERENCE (AGSC '97)



TOWARDS A VIABLE FARM/LAND POLICY FOR SMALLHOLDER FARMERS: WOMEN AND MEN; OLD AND YOUNG

Prof. Marjorie Mbillinyi
University of Dar es Salaam
Institute of Development Studies (IDS)

presented to the AGSC '97, September 15th - 18th at the University of Dar es Salaam.

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THE END OF SMALL-HOLDER FARMING?¹

Marjorie Mbilinyi²

INTRODUCTION

Analysis of the position and conditions of women workers in the rural sector is a study of who has *access* to and *control* over what resources at household, community and workplace level, and why. Power relations determine not only what kind of employment women have access to, compared to men, but also differences among women in access to and control over land, labour, cash income and other basic resources.

This paper is based upon a study of the impact of economic reform on (self)employment conditions of women workers and farmers, compared to men, in rural areas; the extent to which structural adjustment (SAP) policies have deepened pre-existing gender relations and inequalities, or undermined and transformed them; and the viability of smallholder farming under present conditions (political, economic). The latter question is of significance to women and youth, in that smallholder farming has been their major source of (self)employment in the past. In the absence of a functioning (self)employment policy/practice, what does the death of smallholder farming mean for the future of the Tanzanian people/community/culture/nation?

Specific *research questions* included the following:

- viability of smallholder agriculture
- household strategies for survival (and/or accumulation), and the gender patterns therein, with a focus on the combination of farm and off-farm activities
- changes in the gender division of labour in household farming systems, and in household off-farm economic activities,
- household budgets, who provides the cash for the item, from what economic activities
- changes in producer prices and incomes for different crops and off-farm products, with attention to gender differentials

¹ Paper to be presented to Gender & Development Seminar Series (GDSS), 27 August 1997. This paper is mainly based on extracts from "Women Workers and Self-employed in the Rural Sector", Report presented to the National Workshop on Promoting Women's Employment in the Context of Structural Adjustment Programmes in Tanzania, White Sands Hotel, Dar es Salaam, 30 July-1 August 1997, Min of Labour and Youth Dev't & ILO. Full documentation with tables are found in that paper. Acknowledgements to all those who contributed to the ILO study, with particular mention of: Julius Mwabuki, Research Assistant; TPAWU/MWEMA - Mtibwa Sugar Estates, our partners in the field; villagers and leaders of Lusanga and Mbogo villages, Morogoro Rural District, our instructors; staff of Marketing Development Bureau, Min. of Agriculture & Cooperatives & of Sokoine University of Agriculture, and all other resource persons who generously shared their knowledge; participants in the SAP/Employment workshop for feedback; and ILO, facilitators of the process.

² Professor of Education at the Institute of Development Studies, University of Dar es Salaam & Vice-Chairperson (Lobbying/Advocacy), TGNP.

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Marjorie Mbilinyi

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- changes in opportunities for wage employment, including regular/casual terms, wage levels (cash, fringe benefits)
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Because of shortage of space and time, the presentation will focus mainly on the question of changes in outputs and returns to farming, access to and control over land and the viability of smallholder farming. A summary will be made of other findings. A brief description of the research process and the Gender and Employment Workshop organised by workers at Mtibwa Sugar Estates is presented in the next section.

METHODOLOGY

The study was mainly based on secondary analysis of already-existing information, including official statistics. Resource persons were also interviewed, including researchers, policy-makers and practitioners with hands-on information (Mbilinyi 1997:Appendix 1). A short field study of six days duration was carried out during May 1997 in Mtibwa Ward, Morogoro Rural District, at Mtibwa Sugar Estates and at Lusanga and Mbogo Villages, in conjunction with the TPAWU/MWEMA committee at Mtibwa Sugar Estates (hereafter MSE). MWEMA facilitates a process whereby women plantation workers organise themselves in order to fight for their rights as workers and as women. Leaders and several members of the MSE branch of MWEMA participated in the planning of the field work, selection of villages, facilitation of focus group discussions, seminars and workshops, recommendations and evaluation of the process.

A mixture of methods were used during the field work, but the main approach was focus group discussions with separate groups of women plantation workers (guards, field workers and hospital workers) and with village government leaders at Lusanga; an animated workshop with MWEMA representatives from all sectors of MSE to raise issues concerning women's employment and plan actions; seminars with village members (women and men) and local leaders at Mbogo and Lusanga Villages; interviews with individuals in management and trade union positions at MSE; and with regional and district authorities in Morogoro (See Appendices 2, 3 and 4 in Mbilinyi 1997).

A total of 110 women and men took part in focus group discussions and/or seminars at MSE, Mbogo and Lusanga villages: 51 plantation employees, including TPAWU/MWEMA leaders, and 59 villagers and village leaders. All but two of the 51 MSE employees were women, whereas in the villages there was a total of 28 women and 31 men (Mbogo 15 women, 9 men; Lusanga 13 women, 22 men). Twenty-one MSE employees also participated in the Gender and Employment workshop, all but three of whom were women. Several of the women also participated in small group discussions,

but many others were leaders of field sections or departments which could not be visited because of time constraints.

In general, the women plantation workers provided frank and critical views in all three sections. Villagers and their leaders were more circumspect, partly because of the lack of a similar organisational framework through which to work, which had already won their trust -- as in the case of TPAWU/MWEMA for women workers. The mixture of men and women at the Mbogo meeting was also considered to be a handicap, in that only a few women were willing to talk independently of the men. More participation was found among women -- and men -- in the two separate sessions at Lusanga, but in these cases, discussions were still dominated by the more educated or powerful women and men in the village, and those who were older. Young people in each case had to be given special encouragement to speak, although speak they did. These results confirm the need for longer in-depth studies, where researchers and the 'target' group are in a position to develop more familiarity and trust.

Would individual interviews have led to different replies? On the whole, I believe that similar responses would have been found, but some people would have been prepared to provide more detailed elaboration, especially if critical of government policies at local and national level, or of gender relations in the household. At the same time, the participatory techniques used in the focus group discussions and seminars probably enabled *some* people to speak more frankly 'in the third person' or in abstract, in the public meeting, than they might have done on their own. Indeed, at one of the villages the Divisional Secretary, a woman, was provoked to say that women had become too radical, that "what has been voiced here should not lead to negative outcomes at household level. No one should demand changes which were too strong or too fast! It was necessary to follow proper procedures!"³

Gender and Employment Workshop

Some 21 employees participated as leaders of the Mtibwa branch of TPAWU/MWEMA in the *Gender and Employment Workshop* which was held on 28th May 1997. The main objectives of the workshop were to (1) analyse the impact of SAP on conditions of employment and household/family life for workers and farmers; (2) plan strategies for action which focus on causes of problems noted; (3) strengthen gender analysis and animation skills. Songs, group work, a role play, posters and plenary discussion were used to help raise the level of participation and analysis, as shown in the workshop agenda (Appendix 4 - Mbilinyi 1997).

Three small *groups* were created to examine three main issues: 1) economic crisis among workers in particular; (2) family conflict, and 3) conditions of smallholder farmers. All three groups emphasised the negative impact of the fall in real incomes, be they workers' wages or farmers' producer prices, and the responsibility of the

³ Literally "Yaliopatikana yasiwe na matokeo yoyote mabaya katika kaya. Pasiwe na mtu wa kudai mabadliko kwa nguvu na kwa haraka pasipo kufuata utaratibu."

government to take an active role in regulating wages and prices (Groups 1 and 3) or providing credit and promoting gender equity at household and community level (Group 2). Group 3 emphasised the need for smallholder farmers to organise themselves in local groups or self-organised cooperatives to represent their interests viz private traders and the government, and to press for higher producer prices (see Appendix 5 for group reports). Group 1 cautioned the government not to accept every condition demanded by the World Bank (and, by implication, IMF), and especially emphasised the need to reinstate and strengthen the role of the Price Commission. The market should not be left to operate without any form of government regulation and control.

The overall *evaluation* of the workshop and the field work by TPAWU/MWEMA leaders was positive: high participation without fear among many (MSE and villages); open, frank discussion; educative; mixed education/occupational levels enabled a sharing of views; innovative data collection methods, namely the flipchart tables; women learned they could create space -- and use it -- to speak up. On the negative side, people agreed that the time was too short to analyse all the issues relevant to MWEMA, although the objectives of the study were met; that some issues did not come into the open because of fear of victimisation; and that there was a tendency to research the same, close-by villages, instead of going to more isolated locations.

In terms of information generated, people noted that: economic hardship was experienced by both smallscale farmers in the villages and plantation farm workers; cost-sharing has been especially difficult for women, and children are the most endangered; privatisation of MSE may lead to the loss of present social services and infrastructural support, such as the maintenance of feeder roads; credit oppresses rather than helps women because some are taken to court for non-repayment; families have marital difficulties, especially due to drunkenness, and divorces have increased. More "educational" work of this nature was recommended, both at MSE but especially in different villages so as to raise women's awareness of their rights, and to inform one another about macro policies. The results of the research should be reported back to MWEMA and to the villages who participated, for future action. MWEMA plans to work more closely with women's groups in neighbouring villages. This activity was seen as a contribution to the strengthening, therefore, of MWEMA activities.

Structural Adjustment policies (SAP) represent a *counter-reform* process to roll back the reforms associated with *Azimio*, which shifted resources (land, labour, credit, farm inputs/equipment, markets) from the capitalist sector (formerly *white settler farming*) to smallholder farmers during the late 1960s and 1970s. The next section provides a brief summary of key elements of structural adjustment in agriculture.

STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT

The main goal of Structural Adjustment (hereafter SAP) is to increase economic investment and growth, by increasing 'efficiency' in allocation of resources, productivity

and output, by reorienting the economy towards export rather than domestic markets, reducing inflation and improving the balance of payments (TGNP 1994; see Msambichaka, Kilindo and Mjema 1995 for detailed analysis). Tanzania's economy is expected to become more competitive in the world market by reducing production costs - by means of devaluation, control over labour and wage reductions. SAP, by definition, therefore, sets employers' interests against those of workers, foreign capital against domestic capital, and the needs of local consumers against the economic imperatives of 'globalisation'.

A central principle of SAP is to restructure the economy according to market principles, allowing production and trade to proceed with as little government regulation and interference as possible. The emphasis is on 'getting the prices right' in order to send the 'right' signals to employers, manufacturers, farmers, traders, workers, parents, consumers and others about what their priorities ought to be. Prices are to be governed by market forces, but manipulated by devaluation of national currency, raising of bank interest rates and other fiscal and economic policies. [SAP therefore assumes a fully developed market economy, whereas the Tanzanian economy is characterised by severely uneven development of markets in land, labour, credit and other economic factors.]

SAP includes stabilisation and adjustment measures that have *completely altered the environment* for farming and nonfarm activities in the rural areas, and the *access* which rural women and men have to social services, markets, credit, farm inputs, transport, and consumer goods. Stabilisation measures refer to steps taken concerning finance: devaluation, privatisation, liberalisation of trade in currency exchange and commodities, budget reform and cut-backs in social services, withdrawal of food price subsidies for consumers and farm input subsidies for farmers, abolition of exchange price and wage controls -- including worker benefits and worker protection legislation -- and a credit squeeze by increasing interest rates. Stabilisation measures are of special concern to IMF. They have led to cost-sharing in public services, increased sales taxes which raise the cost of living, privatisation of public parastatals, and a general reduction in the role of the national government in provision of social services, including agricultural extension systems.

Adjustment measures refer to institutional reforms: measures to promote export production; the reform of pricing policies so as to increase efficiency and output; the increased role of the private sector in production and the provision of social services; appropriate tax and tariff structures; decentralisation of responsibility for social services and other functions from the central to the local government, families and individuals. The World Bank is especially involved in promoting adjustment measures.

Structural Adjustment of Agriculture

SAP entails a further intensification of the liberalisation policies which began in the 1984-86 period.⁴ Restrictions on the movement of grains across regional boundaries were removed, and uniform pricing abolished. Marketing of food and export crops was fully liberalised in 1994/95, when private traders were allowed to purchase export crops directly from farmers and/or primary societies in the villages, in competition with cooperatives. They are also engaged in distribution of farm inputs and provision of credit, and have become the favoured buyer in many locations.⁵ The functions of National Milling Corporation (NMC) have been reduced to purchases of grains for the Strategic Grain Reserve, and it no longer has access to easy credit from NBC or CRDB. Marketing boards have been streamlined, and their functions largely consist of organising auctions, monitoring crop quality and carrying out research. Cooperatives have become membership organisations, 'freed' of their previous party location.

There is growing pressure on the government to 'liberalise' land tenure/use from the World Bank and other donors, and from corporate business interests in South Africa and elsewhere. Agribusiness seeks security of land ownership and control over crop proceeds, and the assurance that the government will intercede on their behalf in disputes with local villagers over land, water, labour and other basic resources. A growing number of NGOs and CBOs have criticised the proposed land act which reportedly will be submitted to Parliament in October this year for its undemocratic and top-down structures of decision-making, and the gender blindness of its overall conception.⁶ Final authority is vested in the executive branch of government, a perpetuation of the present situation, which has empowered local bureaucrats, promoted corruption, and led to the steady erosion of local community power and control over land in their common domain. The community participates through its local government leaders (village baraza), again, a highly problematic institution which underrepresents women, youth and local poor households.

A loose coalition of concerned NGOs and CBOs (National Land Forum) has been formed to lobby for a postponement of the new land bill, so as to allow all sectors of society to discuss the proposed bill and to forward their views through a democratic and participatory consultative process, beginning at the grassroots level. They also urge that the bill be translated into accessible Kiswahili and disseminated throughout the country. Adequate representation of the views and concerns of women, youth, pastoralists, the poor and other marginalised groups is given special priority.

⁴ This section is drawn from Msambichaka and Naho 1995:36-37 and Kashuliza and Mbiha 1995; see Mbilinyi 1995 for a gender perspective on the restructuring of agriculture.

⁵ The recent struggles for access to tobacco and cotton crops between regional cooperatives and private traders in Songea Rural and Tabora are illustrative of the contradictions that have emerged with market liberalisation. The regional authorities appear to side with inefficient cooperatives and their company supporters, whereas the more vocal farmers and government leaders have insisted on their right to choose from among a variety of crop buyers. Behind the scenes are the competing interests of several transnational corporations, each vying for control of the market.

⁶ See proceedings of the following workshops: HakiArdhi 3 April 1996 and 15-16 May 1997; TAWLA & TAMWA 1997.

Market Liberalisation

Changes in the marketing system of food crops and export crops have had a major impact on women and men farmers. The case of *maize and rice* will be focused on, here in order to illustrate the changed environment in which women farmers must operate, along with their families.⁷ Both women and men grow both crops in most areas, although women's proceeds are mainly used to feed their families, while men's crop is primarily sold for cash. At the same time, women have relied on these and other food crops as their major source of farm cash income, because of patriarchal relations in export crop systems.

During the mid-1960s through the early 1980s, a single marketing channel operated for the major food grains, and farmers received producer price supports, by means of official price levels and pan-territorial prices during the 1970s and early 1980s. Liberalisation policies specifically aimed to remove government price supports for smallholder growers, as well as to open up grain marketing to private traders by creating a multi-channel, competitive market. Public marketing agencies have disengaged from the food trade due to lack of working capital and their inability to compete. NMC purchases insignificant amounts of maize and paddy for its mills, and the Strategic Grain Reserve (SGR) remains the only public organisation which buys relatively large quantities of maize. The size of the Reserve is set at only 50,000 tonnes of grains, but the SGR is the major buyer in remote maize surplus areas (namely Rukwa, Ruvuma, Ludewa District (Iringa), Kiteto District (Arusha). However, it was planned to reduce purchases in Rukwa and Ruvuma 1996/97, and to increase purchases in Dar es Salaam and Dodoma, so as to reduce marketing/ transport costs. This will lead to a decline in competition among maize buyers in the relevant regions, and an even greater decline in producer prices (Mdadila 1996:17).

The majority of private traders in grain were small traders in 1991, with few physical assets and little credit. Official gender-disaggregated information is not available, but a growing number of women were found to be trading in grain, as local and inter-regional traders, by micro-level researchers (Makombe et al 1997, Mbilinyi 1997 for other references). A large number of small traders operate from the main production areas and major urban centres. Most buy maize directly from farmers and bring the crop to the main wholesale market. *Grain marketing at village level is not competitive*, in the sense that most grain purchases are not carried out in a primary market where farmers could choose among different buyers. They face a buyers market, where private traders dominate the situation and in many locations, can dictate prices because of the lack of adequate competition.

In 1991, most of the grain was traded as maize grain rather than flour from the farmer to the retailer and consumer, but by 1995 it was found that there had been an

⁷ The main source is Mdadila 1996 (MDB R.1/94); backed up by interviews with MDB staff and regional agricultural authorities. See also Kashuliza and Mbiha 1995, Mbonde 1992, Msambichaka and Naho 1995, Turuka 1995.

increase in the number of *largescale maize millers* who became a key link between the maize trader and the sembe consumer.⁸

Rice marketing also depends on a large number of small traders who purchase small quantities of paddy directly from farmers and transport it to mills where it is milled and sold as rice to inter-regional traders or to local retailers (Mdadila 1996:14). Larger inter-regional traders take the rice to large markets. Alternatively, interregional traders go directly to the villages to purchase paddy, bring it to the mill, and send rice to consumption centres. Large rice mills are also beginning to fill the rural and urban landscape.

Market liberalisation has increased the number of private traders who operate in the countryside, and provided additional incentives for farmers to produce more food, at least in those areas which are on or near good all-weather roads, and not far from major consumption centres. However, major constraints have been identified by MDB which *reduce the returns available to women and men smallholder farmers* (paraphrased from p.20, *ibid*):

- absence of buying centres and few traders at village level, thus reducing competition among buyers and creating a buyers market instead
- traders' insistence to use volume unit measures rather than weight measures, which leads to cheating on prices
- absence of a grading system, thereby reducing the incentive to maintain quality output
- impossibility of collecting lawful levies and information under present market conditions.

Import-export merchants, big and small, have also become key actors in the food trade outside of the country, in place of the government and NMC. The private sector has concentrated on the importation of wheat grain, rice and sugar and the export of beans, rice and maize. Unofficial trade has also expanded, especially along the borders with neighbouring countries. This is of special significance to this study, *as women have been particularly active in cross-border trade*, exporting food stuffs and purchasing textiles (Kigoma), beer (Taveta), sugar (Malawi, in the late 1980s at least) and other commodities. Recent studies in Arusha, Kilimanjaro, Tanga, Mara, Mwanza, Mbeya, Rukwa, Kigoma and Kagera discovered that the major export items were *food stuffs*: mainly maize, beans, and rice. The imports varied depending on the border country: processed household goods and beer from Kenya; sugar from Malawi and Zambia; textiles from Zambia; beer from Malawi; hard currency and gold from Zaire. 'Unofficial' cross-border trade brought in high profits, reduced time spent dealing with bureaucracy, and reduced transport costs to other major trade centres (*ibid*: p. 24). The

⁸ For example, at least four large scale maize mills, with a total annual milling capacity of 75,000 tonnes of maize, were installed by private companies in Dar es Salaam between 1992 and 1994. Traders have begun to deliver maize directly to the large and medium scale mills, which have been built in rural areas such as Morogoro, as well as in Dar es Salaam (Mdadila 1996).

major problems were harassment from state officials; uncertainty of government policy; conflicting policies as implemented by central and regional authorities, with regional authorities projected as acting "contrary to the interest of the farmer, trader and national policy" (p.24).

Agriculture provides an *increasing* share of Gross Domestic Product and export earnings - actually one indicator of the deindustrialisation process underlying SAP - and provides some 80% of the population with full- or part-time employment. The next section examines the structure of agriculture.

CAPITALIST AND SMALLHOLDER FARMING

Agriculture consists of three main actors in Tanzania, smallholder farmers, small commercial farmers and largescale capitalist enterprises owned by private and parastatal companies and transnational corporations. The farming systems in each case differ, and they have differing access to key resources of land, credit and labour. Women increasingly depend on part-time wage employment in the largescale capitalist sector, which they combine with part-time smallscale farming. At the same time, both the capitalist and the smallholder farming systems depend on the *patriarchal farming system*, which is structured around elderly male domination in power relations at household level, and the exploitation of the *unpaid labour* of women, youth and other household dependents in the production of crops and other produce for household use/consumption and sale.

According to 1994 data (Koda 1994), there were 730 large farming/ranching enterprises in Tanzania, holding about 2 million hectares (average holding 2740 ha), and 3.5 million farm households holding some 46,000 sq. km. Some 46% of the large farms were parastatals, holding 78% of the large farm acreage. The NSCA data for 1994/95 Mainland (Vol II) indicated an increase for both sectors: 2000 commercial/large farms, and 3.8 million holdings, covering 10,764,000 hectares (average holding 3 ha). If we assume that the 2000 commercial farms continue to hold 2 million ha (a conservative assumption), each large farm controls 1000 ha on the average. The *total largescale sector consisting of 0.02% of all holdings, controls 16% of the total land under cultivation (12,764,000 ha total)*. However, many of the parastatal farms and ranches are being privatised or moved into joint ventures. There appears to be an expansion in largescale investments in agriculture, both by nationals and foreign entrepreneurs. Hence, these figures do not reflect the present situation, and should be considered an *under-estimation* of the number and significance of largescale agriculture in the country.

Differentiation is also found among smallholder farmers. Some 70% are operating only 1 or 2 plots of 0.4 ha. a plot, i.e. a maximum of 0.4-0.8 ha. under cultivation, which is considered too small to sustain an average household in most areas (AGSC 1994/95: vol II). Some 60% of farm households are crop cultivators, 40% mixed crop and livestock-keeping, and 0.4% livestock-keeping only. The average household

112, Lindi and Mtwara 110, Mbeya and Dodoma 109, Singida and Shinyanga 108, and Tanga and the Coast 106. Morogoro, Ruvuma, Rabora and Kagera share a sex ratio of 105, in Rukwa it is 104 (ibid:16). This reflects the historical trend of male rural-urban migration which began during the colonial era and accelerated after independence, leaving women behind to sustain the rural economy. The only regions with more men than women are Dar es Salaam 93 and Arusha 98; they reach parity or 100 in Kilimanjaro.

The major explanation for out-migration from rural areas is economic: low rural incomes, economic hardship, scarcity of arable land - especially for women and youth -- and the desire for non-farm employment. This reveals strong dissatisfaction with existing employment conditions. Oppressive and exploitative relations *within* smallholder farming have become especially intolerable. The next section provides a summary of the main findings concerning gender relations in employment in formal and informal sectors, including within the smallholder farm sector itself.

GENDER AND EMPLOYMENT IN RURAL AREAS¹⁰

During the 1978-1988 period, there was an increased involvement of young women and men 15-19 years of age, and children, in rural economic activities. The portion of women who worked as *unpaid family labour declined*, and employment conditions for women and men became more similar, as men lost their past advantage in formal wage employment and increasingly depended on the informal sector. Nevertheless, women's wage earnings remained lower than men's, and they continued to be relegated to low paying, unskilled or lesser skilled work, and had less advancement to decision-making positions at the top of the job hierarchy.

Most people worked at least part-time in agriculture/fishing/forestry, women more than men; men had more opportunities in nonagricultural sectors. Gender patterns were also found in types of informal sector employment, with women located in stereotypical female activities (eg beer brewing, sewing, food preparation/sale, hair saloon). Some women were also working, however, in road and building construction, mining, and long distance grains trade.

Smallholder farm production suffered a reduced labour supply because of the withdrawal of young women and men during the 1986- period. They engaged in nonfarm activities in their villages or nearby rural trade centres, sought casual farm work on neighbouring plantations or large farms, or migrated to town for informal employment. The major causes were *land shortages and deterioration, declining farm incomes*, increased opportunities in nonfarm employment, and resistance against patriarchal forms of unpaid family labour - young people *and women* want to earn cash so as to meet their daily needs.

¹⁰ See Mbilinyi 1997 for full analysis and documentation.

size is 5.4, with a total of 21 million household members engaged in agriculture, 8,747,000 or 40% of them on a full-time basis (53% of whom were women, 47% men). About 17% of the agricultural households were headed by women (F HH H) and 83% by men (M HH H).⁹

Major regional and district differentiation is also found in livestock holdings and food security. Only 37% of all agricultural households kept livestock (90% of livestock-keeping households kept goats, 80% cattle, 36% sheep, only 10% donkeys -AGSC 1994/95 Vol. III p. 13). Moreover, livestock tended to be concentrated in certain regions. Cattle were mainly raised in 10 regions: Dodoma, Arusha, Kilimanjaro, Tanga, Mbeya, Singida, Tabora, Shinyanga, Mwanza and Mara.

RURAL DECLINE, URBANISATION AND FEMALE HEADSHIP

The rural areas have changed demographically, economically and socially, and gender relations have been a significant part of that change. The *rural areas are shrinking*, demographically at least. The share of the total population that was urban grew from 6% in 1967 to 14% in 1978 and 21% in 1988, according to the population censuses of those years (Maduhu 1994:35). Tanzania has one of the *highest rates of urbanisation* in Sub-Saharan Africa: the urban population increased by 53% between 1978 and 1988, with an even higher growth rate of 57% on the mainland.

This rural-urban migration reflects the movement of thousands of young women and men away from the countryside to towns in search of better opportunities in employment, education and access to social services. The majority are absorbed in the informal sector, but a growing number of women and youth find employment on plantations and large farms. The search for better opportunities is the other side of the *deterioration in and of smallholder agriculture* as a result of counter-reform policies which have undermined the capacity of smallholder farm households to sustain themselves (including most household members) in farming. Who are the *winners*, if not largescale growers, who now have access to a ever expanding supply of cheap, usually casual labour, as well as a monopoly over credit and other resources.

More women have left the countryside to go to urban areas, compared to men, so much so that the number of women in urban areas now outnumbers men, as shown in population census figures for 1978 and 1988 (BOS 1995:1). The female/male sex ratios in urban mainland Tanzania increased from 93 women per 100 men in 1978, to 101 in 1988, whereas in urban Zanzibar, the sex ratio has remained the same (105). On the other hand, there has also been an *increase in the female/male sex ratio* in the rural areas from 106 to 108 in the mainland and from 99 to 106 in Zanzibar, for the same years respectively. The sex ratio is especially high in some regions: eg Iringa 116, Kigoma

⁹ Detailed analyses of gender differentiation in access to and control of land, livestock, labour and other resources are provided in Chs 6, 7 and 8 of Mbilinyi 1997.

An increasing number of women of all ages have become employed on a regular and casual basis on sugar, tea and sisal plantations. Their opportunities are restricted, more than men, to lesser paying, unskilled work, though "skills" categories are often arbitrary, and enabled employers to keep wages down. The field study at Mtibwa Sugar Estates in 1977 documented a 26% reduction in total employment during the 1992-1997 period; and a corresponding lesser decline for women of 11%. Does this mean that women were and are in less danger of being fired during the present restructuring process? Perhaps, depending on the particular occupation and sector of employment. At the same time, most women plantation workers were employed on a casual basis in different plantations and farms, which means they do not show up in these figures because they are not counted. Casual workers are deprived of most worker benefits, including maternity leave, annual leave, and full medical support, and therefore represent *cheap* labour.

Mtibwa management was forced to cutback employment in order to reduce production costs, increase profits, and become a more attractive buy for potential private investors. The figures refer mainly to permanent employees. A surplus labour supply existed in neighbouring villages, as well as among long-distance migrants, and many women failed to find work.

The rising cost of living, declining farm incomes and short-term drought were given as the main reasons for seeking employment on the plantations. Field-workers were not at all satisfied with work conditions, and workers in all sectors felt that their wages were too low - one-eighth to one-fourth of their daily expenses. A large proportion of women workers were female heads of households, more than women farmers in neighbouring villages.

Some 30% of all Tanzanian households were headed by women, according to the 1988 population census, with slightly more in Zanzibar (33%) compared to the mainland (30% - *Women and Men* 1995:14). The proportion is nearly the same in rural and urban areas in the mainland (29.5% and 31.6% respectively), and there are more households headed by women in rural compared to urban Zanzibar (33.1% and 31.6% respectively - *ibid*:19). Women household heads, in general, had access to fewer resources than men (land, labour, farm inputs, credit), which had a negative impact on the sustainability of household economic activities and overall household incomes.

1988 census data for household heads (male and female) in rural mainland and Zanziba was also analysed. This helps to correct for the distortion arising from the other data, which includes age groups 10 years and up. The majority of male heads are married (89% and 87% on the mainland and Zanzibar), far more than female heads (58% and 50%), but then, one might have expected none of the women heads to be married. Married women are likely to be heading a household whose principal male is absent, having migrated to live elsewhere, and only present periodically, if at all. As women said in Lusanga Village (1997), "The man comes home to plant another baby and off he

goes.” Dissatisfaction with the heavy burdens that women carried because of male absence was emphasised by many village women in Mbeya, Kondoa and Songea during recent education field work by TGNP (see IGN Reports, especially that of Chale and Mukangara (1997). This illustrates the negative impact of male out-migration in search of employment in other rural areas or in town.

Far more women than men heads are widowed and divorced in both locations (mainland and Zanzibar), but fewer women than men are single in Zanzibar, compared to near parity on the mainland. This data confirms qualitative research findings which quote widowed and divorced women as saying that they choose not to remarry: “Why add another child to the household?” “I don’t want another burden/mzigo” or as one Mtibwa field worker said in 1997, “Who in their right mind would accept problems?” [“Nani atakubali matatizo?”]¹¹ Women referred to the perceived growth in irresponsibility of men, who no longer provided cash needs for their families, and often did not provide obligatory labour inputs into farming and other nonfarm activities either. These views partly reflect the impact of falling male incomes and growing un- and underemployment on gender relations at household level, at a time when cash requirements are steadily increasing. The decline in male incomes is due to falling returns for export and other cash crops (see below) along with the decline in formal employment, and the growing scarcity of fertile land and water supplies in many areas.

Other studies have found a smaller portion of female headed households, which may be due to different definitions of “household head”, as well as different populations under study. For example, the recent 1994 Indicator Monitory Survey (hereafter IMS) in both rural and urban areas came out with a figure of 20% (BOS 1996:36). Some 67% of the households in IMS were rural, 5% Dar es Salaam and the remainder in other urban places. The National Sample Census of Agriculture (hereafter NSCA) is another valuable source of information, as it focuses on farm households in rural areas. In 1994/95, some 17% of the farm households on the mainland were headed by women (MOA/BOS vol 1 1996:9). NSCA data has shown fluctuations in the proportion of female-headed households of the total, from 15.2% in 1986/87, down to 14.6% in 1989/90 and up to 17.5% in 1990/91 on the mainland (cited in Koda 1994b:T.4.1). In Zanzibar, the percentage female heads rose from 27.8% in 1980 and 1985, to 29.8% in 1993, which is comparable to the census findings.

Recent research, including the 1997 Mtibwa study, have found that young men, and women, were *choosing* not to marry (Mbilinyi 1995b, n.above). The young men explained that they lacked the resources necessary, such as land, a house and enough cash income. Rural unemployment and general economic decline were considered to be major obstacles. In Lusanga Village, people said that young men were in a rush to earn money, and forgot other priorities such as marriage and farming. Mbogo villagers attributed the delayed marriage patterns to the land crisis: “Without land, how can our

¹¹ See Mbilinyi 1991, Mbilinyi/Semakafu 1995, Chale & Mukangara 1997, Lazaro 1995, and confirmed by several women villagers in the Mtibwa 1997 field work.

young men marry?" Young women had regular sexual partners and bore children, but increasingly chose not to marry, because they feared the *costs of having a husband*! Even parents encouraged their daughters not to marry, according to some Mtibwa workers, because of the problems which married women faced.

Another implication of the trends noted above is the risk of HIV/AIDS infection associated with less stable sexual relations, whether married or not. Women workers and farmers both expressed a high level of anxiety about their risk of getting infected by their male partners, including husbands. The major problem was male promiscuity and unwillingness to use a condom at home. Some men protected themselves with condoms when having sex with girlfriends and mistresses, but they all refused to use them in sexual relations with their spouses. Women who broached the subject to husbands or boyfriends were accused of being unfaithful! Hence, most men did not perceive safe sex practices as necessary to protect 'the other' from one's self, but rather as a means of self-protection.

Some of the women field workers pointed out that most people were fatalistic about HIV/AIDS because there was no cure. They labelled it "ajali kazini", one of the accident risks that came with "work", and blamed infection on men, whom they called "murderers". The level of risk must be very high on the plantations, where a large number of married and unmarried women and men live in crowded quarters, including a large population of "bachelor" male migrant workers, far from their homes and communities

Women had become more responsible than ever before for provision of cash needs in the household, partly due to declining male incomes and reduced employment opportunities. Increased independence and decision-making power was counterbalanced with high work loads, economic stress and increased marital conflict.

Subjective comparisons of "life" during the last five years, or during the 1987-1992 period, by plantation workers and village farmers (women and men), found that: wages and farm incomes were lower, production costs were higher, people worked harder than before for less return, and money had less value (i.e. inflation). They faced landlessness as a result of the inroads of commercial farmers and company-owned plantations on village land and commons, and had been transformed from independent farmers into casual farm workers.

Both women and men carried out most farm operations, especially in key cash crops, but women continued to do most of the farm work in production of household foodstuffs and nearly all of the reproductive work (cooking, collection of water and fuel), with the assistance of children. Women had seized more decision-making power than before at household and community level, as a result of increasing female incomes. However, gender inequalities were found in access to and control over key resources: land, farm inputs/equipment, credit, labour supply and information, which led to lower

yields on the farms of female household heads. Women farmers and traders created women's organisations to access scarce resources and enhance their incomes.

The rise of female-headed households and increased female economic power was associated with the loss of male incomes and employment -- i.e. *male economic impotence*, with potentially tragic outcomes for women, men and their communities. Female incomes remained exceedingly low and insufficient to sustain a family. An alternative strategy for sustainable development is needed, which relies on local resources and local initiative, can be managed democratically by women and men, old and young, and provides dignified livelihoods on an equal and equitable basis.

The next section examines agriculture performance in terms of outputs and returns.

OUTPUT AND RETURNS IN SMALLHOLDER FARMING

The majority of rural women depend on agriculture for their livelihood, as full-time and part-time farmers and/or as farm workers on plantations, commercial farms and smallholder farms. Many women also depend on agriculture indirectly, as a source of raw material (eg for homebrew beer or manufactured foodstuffs), and a market for their goods (as providers of services to others employed in agriculture).

The welfare of the entire household and family depends on the proceeds from export crops and/or cash food crops, and/or livestock. True, access and control of resources and benefits vary depending on gender, age, marital status and relationship to the household head. This is the site of growing gender conflict, but also the terrain upon which women have increased their negotiating strength and resulting economic power at household level. Nevertheless, women continue to depend on the proceeds from cash crops, directly and indirectly, and have a vital stake in monitoring the impact on crop returns of macro-level policies such as market liberalisation, devaluation and reduction of farm support systems provided by the state.

According to mainstream discourse, agriculture production went downhill after independence, especially after Arusha Declaration policies of 1967, and has only been rescued by the liberalisation policies of the late '80s and 1990s. Table 1 presents production trends in eight major cash crops, measured in volume tonnage (sisal, cotton lint, hulled coffee, tea, tobacco, pyrethrum flowers, cashew nuts and sugar), indexed to 1976 output figures (BOS 1994a: Table 8.1). They indicate the following:

- crop production increased in all crops *after independence*, even crops which were heavily dependent on white settler growers in the colonial era (up to 1960), who 'fled' Tanzania after independence -- small farmers made up the difference; colonial outputs were extremely low as percentages of 1976

figures, with the sole exception of sisal, a plantation crop owned primarily by large corporations based in Europe

- output continued to rise during the 1960s and 1970s, with peak levels reached *after Arusha reforms* in nearly all cases (cotton 1973, coffee 1973, tea 1979, only surpassed in 1990 & 1991, tobacco 1977, cashew 1974, sugar 1978 -- sisal 1964, pyrethrum 1967).
- production began to decline in most cases around 1977/78/79, with dramatic drops in the early 1980s - the period of forex crisis, when state support systems for agriculture were no longer functioning, and both small and large growers faced shortages of fertilisers, pesticides and other farm inputs
- production during the post-SAP (post-1986) era has been mixed, with increases shown for cotton, coffee, tea; continued low output in cashew pyrethrum, sugar and sisal; and fluctuations in the case of tobacco.

There have been few studies *at farm level* on the impact of policy reforms, and none which take gender into consideration (Kashuliza and Mbiha 1995, Meena 1991, Meena et al 1993)). Most macro-level studies, and government proclamations, use baseline figures in the early 1980s or the 1978-79 period, after output had begun to decline - i.e. when the only way to go is up!

Msambichaka and Naho (1995) disaggregated agriculture performance for the following time periods: 1976-80, 1983/84-85/86 (ERP1) and 1986/87-1993/94 (ERP2). The late 70s period is referred to, rather inappropriately, as the "socialist experience" -- inappropriately in that the capacity of the Tanzanian state to sustain its social welfare and farm support system had declined by 1978/79, and these were key elements of the so-called socialist experience. Nevertheless, the data provides a useful benchmark for comparisons of later periods, with the caveat that production trends for most crops were decidedly upward throughout the '70s, and began to decline during 1978-1980s period (Table 1). The second period refers to the first era of economic reforms which was largely funded by domestic resources, and the post-1986 period to SAP with substantial foreign funding.

Of special interest are food crops like cassava, maize and paddy over which women have had more control than industrial export crops. Maize and paddy outputs began to recover from their late '70s low of 4.7% growth rate during the early 1980s period (ERP1) -- growth rates for maize and paddy were 23.4% and 6.3% respectively -- but maize growth rates declined to *below that '70s figure* during ERP2, 0.2% (ibid:40). Growth rates for paddy also dropped during ERP2 to 1.2%, but this was still an improvement on the - 4.6% decline during the late 1970s. Cassava saw an increase in growth rate from 2.9% during the late '70s to 8.3% ERP1, which was sustained at 8.4% during ERP2. The increased output of maize and paddy during the 1980s was not caused by increased productivity, which declined from a growth rate of 11.1% and 17.3% during

Table 1 Production of Major Cash Crops Index (1976=100)

Year	Sisal fibres	cotton lint	hulled coffee	tea	tobacco	pyrethrum flowers	cashew nuts	sugar
1951	130	21	34	8	15	8	00	8
1952	145	20	35	8	12	6	00	9
1953	151	33	29	9	10	7	00	11
1954	160	22	37	12	18	12	00	10
1955	158	44	36	14	15	16	00	10
1956	166	52	43	17	15	19	00	17
1957	165	57	39	20	15	19	00	17
1958	176	72	43	20	18	16	00	19
1959	184	74	43	26	19	20	00	25
1960	184	85	50	26	16	26	68	26
1961	177	81	37	32	19	33	33	26
1962	191	72	50	30	12	49	68	36
1963	191	92	54	36	16	58	70	45
1964	205	112	63	34	15	58	90	56
1965	191	125	64	40	36	93	92	61
1966	198	158	97	48	36	112	101	64
1967	194	186	75	51	55	170	102	65
1968	173	167	97	52	51	122	143	75
1969	184	122	86	62	82	95	138	83
1970	178	164	93	60	78	59	135	79
1971	162	180	86	74	84	93	148	87
1972	138	154	97	90	100	108	156	80
1973	137	182	111	91	92	102	152	99
1974	126	154	75	92	98	83	176	88
1975	109	168	108	98	128	120	135	93
1976	100[113698]	100[42410]	100[53351]	100[14075]	100[14223]	100[3945]	100[82370]	100[11056]
1977	92	158	85	119	135	83	118	90
1978	81	119	100	124	128	65	83	121
1979	72	132	93	127	121	41	69	103
1980	76	143	90	121	12	41	50	111
1981	65	138	125	112	117	51	69	110
1982	53	105	102	117	114	48	54	108
1983	41	101	100	110	96	41	40	114
1984	34	99	93	117	74	36	59	102
1985	28	94	92	120	94	39	39	94
1986	27	74	101	99	88	34	23	91
1987	29	163	78	103	116	31	20	86
1988	29	183	92	106	91	36	29	92
1989	28	131	104	124	81	33	23	87
1990	30	79	97	135	83	41	21	101
1991	32	111	--	135	116	43	35	--

* rounded off to the nearest digit

figures in brackets [] are tonnes output in index year

Source: BOS 1994a: T. 8.1

declined from a growth rate of 11.1% and 17.3% during the late 70s, to -2.5% and -0.0% during ERP1 for maize and paddy respectively (ibid:41). Cassava, the only exception, showed improved yields from a decline of -1.7% to 7.6% rise for the same time periods.

The authors also queried the extent to which the reforms encouraged farmers to increase land under cultivation of food crops. Comparisons of growth rates of land under cultivation of the three food crops during ERP1 and ERP2 found different trends: declines for maize and cassava (from 10.9% and 5.1% to 2.8% and 0.8% respectively), and increase for paddy from a decline of -3.5% during ERP1 to a slight increase of 1.2% land cultivated in ERP2 (ibid 43).

What about *export crops*, the main priority during both ERP periods? The authors focused on cotton, which is *the* basic smallholder export crop. They found a *decline* in the growth rate in output figures, from 10.9% to 2.8% during ERP1 and ERP2 respectively, and a decline in yields. There was a corresponding decline in growth rates of area under cotton cultivation (1.2% to -1.0%) and of yields (3.2% to 0.5%).

The *export performance* of the 7 basic crops (coffee, cotton, sisal, tea, tobacco and cashew nuts) has also been disappointing (ibid: 47-49). During the early '80s before ERP1, there was an increase in world prices for coffee, tea and tobacco, at least, but volumes exported also declined. During the ERP period, foreign exchange earnings have tended to stagnate because of declines in export volume when prices increased (sisal), or *declining world prices* which nullify increased exported volumes (coffee, tea, cashew nuts). Cotton and tobacco were the exceptions in recording positive increases of export prices and volumes. Most production is exported, with a steady decline in volumes sold to local industries for cotton, tea and flue tobacco; and upward trends only for sisal and fire tobacco (coffee not shown - ibid 49). This trend corresponds to the deindustrialisation process under way in the Tanzanian economy.

The drop in world crop prices is a long term trend, as is the worsening terms of trade between traditional export crops and imported manufactured goods and high technology. Policies to increase traditional exports are highly irrational, from the point of view, at least, of Tanzanian producers and the Tanzanian government, but not for transnational corporations who profit from ever cheaper raw materials (Coote 1992).

What about crop output figures in the 1990s? Farmers produced less maize, paddy, wheat, sorghum, millets and pulses during the early 1990s, according to 1984/85-1995/96 data provided by the Food Security Department, Ministry of Agriculture, and output only began to increase during 1994/95 and 1995/96 (cited in Mdadila 1996: Table 1,p.3). Different trends were found, however, for different regions and districts, due especially to the higher costs of transport and farm inputs in more distant areas, coupled with lower producer prices.[details found in Mbilinyi 1997]. Attention will be focused here on maize, coffee and sugar cane, exemplifying a staple food crop, an export crop and an industrial food crop.

There was a decline of maize output, with fluctuations, during the 1988/89-1991/92 period, but increases were found in 1994/95 and 1995/96 and very different trends were found for different regions (ibid). The reform process has appeared to stimulate output in northern and western areas (namely Mwanza, Kilimanjaro, Kagera and Kigoma, where production increased) but discouraged producers in the former 'breadbasket', the southern regions of Rukwa, Ruvuma, Iringa and Mbeya, where proportionate output has declined, as in the original top six (the four southern regions plus Dodoma and Arusha). The major explanation for the declining output in the south are declining producer prices and incomes arising from liberalisation, transport costs arising from long distances from markets, the removal of fertilizer subsidies, and declining returns to labour, given the rising costs of farm inputs.¹²

Coffee has remained one of Tanzania's top export earners (Mwaikambo 1995). The two main types of coffee are Mild Arabica (72% annual production) found in the Northern Zone (Kilimanjaro and Arusha) and Southern Highlands (Mbeya and Ruvuma) and Robusta (20% annual production), mainly grown in the Western zone (Kagera). Only 8% total annual production consists of Hard Arabica. Most coffee output comes from smallholder growers, responsible for 95% of area under coffee in 1991/92, and 90% of coffee output. Some 10% output is grown on large coffee estates owned by cooperatives, public and private companies and commercial farmers. Substantial variation in coffee farm size exists among smallholders, however. According to the 1993/94 coffee marketing review which recorded volume of coffee purchases since 1958/59 to 1994/95, coffee output during the 1980s and 1990s tended to stagnate with fluctuations, and never reached the peak output of 66,611 tonnes in 1980/81 (ibid:7). Substantial *zonal differences* were found, however, with the Southern Zone recording a 65% increase during the last eleven years, compared to an 11% decline in the Northern Zone and a 23% decline between 1990/91 and 1992/93 in the Western Zone. Estates output declined some 46% between 1980/81 and 1992/93, thus contributing to the general decline throughout this period.

The main explanation for the decline among smallholder coffee producers in the North included: aging trees, disease, *unreliable supplies of agrochemicals*, *institutional changes in input suppliers*, declining yields, and *high marketing costs*, despite market reforms (ibid:8). The major constraints faced by the estates included: deterioration in state-owned coffee estates, and *disinvestment by private growers in response to falling financial returns* compared to other crops. Estates have not expanded area under coffee production, whereas there has been a *53% expansion in smallholder acreage* under coffee between 1972/73 and 1992/93, mostly during the *1970s and 1980s* in Mbozi and Mbinga in the South, and in the Western region, in response to favourable prices, and institutional support from donor-led projects (p.9). These are former labour-reserve areas, which lacked access to markets and transport infrastructure in the past, for whom coffee could well represent a positive alternative. Northern coffee growers have had a different,

¹² Nevertheless, the top six regions remain, in order of output, during 1995/96, Shinyanga, Iringa, Mwanza, Mbeya, Ruvuma and Rukwa (ranging from 332,000 tonnes in Shinyanga to 205,000 tonnes in Rukwa, compared to the lowest output of 57,000 tonnes in Lindi (ibid).

more advantaged history, with good infrastructure and support systems, beginning in the colonial era. They have not expanded their coffee farms because of the *decline in real prices*, scarcity of land, and the pressure from competing and more profitable food crops. Factors highlighted are those most directly affected by reform policies, including market restructuring and liberalisation.

Sugar cane has experienced increasing output with fluctuations during the period of 1982/83 to 1993/94, according to the 1993/94 industry review (Toke 1995). Although most of the sugar cane is produced on estates (mainly Kilombero, Mtibwa and TPC), the share coming from the sugar outgrower sector has increased significantly during the same period (330%), and is largely responsible for the growth in output (estates output showed a 103% increase during the same period, my own calculations based on data in Table 1). The output from growers has increased, as a share of total annual sugar cane production, from 11% to 35% during the same period (ibid:6).

Outgrower production is only significant for Kilombero and Mtibwa plantations. The relations between the estates and the outgrowers have changed over time, as have the ownership patterns in the industry. The sugar estates had been privately owned companies, and became parastatal companies after nationalisation in the late 60s-early 70s (Sterkenburg and Wiel 1993). The government sought to increase outgrower production so as to increase income redistribution and rural (self)employment in the 1970s, but during the 1980s, the area under cane and the output realised declined. The decline was partly caused by low producer prices, and the lack of adequate farm support services from both the government extension services and the estates. Historically, the estates were expected to provide support on a credit basis, in the provision of machinery to clear and prepare the land, and for planting. They even provided hired labour to weed, harvest and transport cane during peak seasons. However, the estate management faced rising costs in the 1980s, and scaled down its support for outgrowers, partly out of expectations of low returns (ibid).

Since 1990, outgrowers production has increased, for a variety of reasons: *increased producer prices, increased returns*, improved communications between company management and outgrowers, the creation of outgrower associations in Kilombero and Mtibwa to represent their interests (ibid). Another factor is *the loosening of restrictions on management participation in outgrower production* during the early 1990s (Mbilinyi 1995b). This has given management an added incentive to be supportive of outgrowers, although with the possibility of a conflict of interest in the long run. The result has been an increase in area under outgrower cultivation, increased yields and increased output (Sterkenberg and Wiel 1995:11). At Mtibwa, the share of total cane provided by outgrowers was more than that of the estates (57%) in 1995/96, a level first reached in 1994/95, its top level from 17% share in 1988/89 (Mtibwa 1997 study). Reports indicated the share had dropped back down to 40% in 1996/97. Management reported overproduction of cane coming from the two sources, in the light of the present factory capacity. Deliberate priority was given to the outgrowers' output, so as not to

discourage them.¹³ Company output data indicated, however, that estates' output had been declining since 1991/92, and factory output depended on increased outgrowers production.

Mtibwa management had mixed views about the effects of economic reforms. On the one hand, the availability of forex had enabled them to import equipment and rehabilitate the factory. They were not hurt by devaluation, as other companies were, because they had already paid off their loans in the early 1990s. However, competition from cheap, imported sugar had caused substantial market losses, so much that Mtibwa sugar was no longer sold in Dar es Salaam, but kept for the regions and export to Europe. Unit production costs in Tanzania were higher than that of the top African sugar producing countries, namely Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Swaziland, because of the relatively small size of the estates, which made it uncompetitive in regional and global markets.

Falling Returns

Why has agriculture performance been so disappointing, in contrast to the original optimistic forecasts which were used to rationalise the reform process? One of the key explanations, according to Msambichaka and Naho, is the decline in distribution and consumption of farm inputs. The growth rate in tonnage distribution of fertilizers declined from 0.2 % during 1980-86, to -0.5 % during 1987-93, and of improved seeds from -3.3% to -14.9% during the same time periods (ibid:51). Table 2.12 (ibid: 53) provides the same data year by year, disaggregated by food crops. The greatest decline in growth rates was found for most crops during the *post-1986* period. Their explanation for this decline includes *the failure of private traders* to provide fertilizer and improved seeds, as needed, in spite of the opening up of inputs distribution to the market, and the *removal of adequate farm support systems*, especially to smallholder farmers, in the form of *farm input subsidies*.

A recent study of large commercial farmers in Iringa found *that incomplete reform of marketing institutions* in the export crop sector compounded the problem for farmers during the late 80s, and contributed to low farmgate producer prices and low returns (Booth 1991). Export marketing boards retained their monopoly position in trade up to 1990, and full market liberalisation of export crops was only realised around 1993/94. *The farmgate price received by farmers was much lower than the world producer price*, because of the large share taken by export marketing boards and/or cooperative unions, reportedly for overhead expenditures, transport and the like (see below).¹⁴ Smallholders remained dependent on cooperatives as their major marketing

¹³ An example of the pitfalls of the present situation, where a clear case of conflict of interest can be shown, since management officials were also outgrowers.

¹⁴ According to everyday knowledge, a large percentage of export crop earnings is reportedly embezzled by top management, with the connivance of political and administrative leaders who receive their 'cut'. For example, Booth 1991:17 and n.14, found that the Tanzania Tobacco Marketing Board was misleading public opinion "by misreporting the prices obtained from foreign buyers and providing politicians with misleading average grower prices" (n.14).

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Falling Returns

Why has agriculture performance been so disappointing, in contrast to the original optimistic forecasts which were used to rationalise the reform process? One of the key explanations, according to Msambichaka and Naho, is the decline in distribution and consumption of farm inputs. The growth rate in tonnage distribution of fertilizers declined from 0.2 % during 1980-86, to -0.5 % during 1987-93, and of improved seeds from -3.3% to -14.9% during the same time periods (ibid:51). Table 2.12 (ibid: 53) provides the same data year by year, disaggregated by food crops. The greatest decline in growth rates was found for most crops during the *post-1986* period. Their explanation for this decline includes *the failure of private traders to provide fertilizer and improved seeds, as needed, in spite of the opening up of inputs distribution to the market, and the removal of adequate farm support systems, especially to smallholder farmers, in the form of farm input subsidies.*

A recent study of large commercial farmers in Iringa found *that incomplete reform of marketing institutions* in the export crop sector compounded the problem for farmers during the late 80s, and contributed to low farmgate producer prices and low returns (Booth 1991). Export marketing boards retained their monopoly position in trade up to 1990, and full market liberalisation of export crops was only realised around 1993/94. *The farmgate price received by farmers was much lower than the world producer price, because of the large share taken by export marketing boards and/or cooperative unions, reportedly for overhead expenditures, transport and the like (see below).*¹⁴ Smallholders remained dependent on cooperatives as their major marketing

¹³ An example of the pitfalls of the present situation, where a clear case of conflict of interest can be shown, since management officials were also outgrowers.

¹⁴ According to everyday knowledge, a large percentage of export crop earnings is reportedly embezzled by top management, with the connivance of political and administrative leaders who receive their 'cut'. For example, Booth 1991:17 and n.14, found that the Tanzania Tobacco Marketing Board was misleading public opinion "by misreporting the prices obtained from foreign buyers and providing politicians with misleading average grower prices" (n.14).

outlet, whereas big commercial farmers of oil seeds, spices and pulses were “freed” and able to export directly overseas, but faced major bureaucratic hurdles in order to secure export licences and their forex earnings. Farmers, both big and small, were also hurt by devaluation, which led to a major increase in producer costs for labour, farm inputs and farm equipment. The extremely high interest rates charged for credit and the abolition of soft loans policies in all the major banking institutions also deprived most farmers of access to necessary farm credit.

Although focused on Iringa Region, Booth’s findings have since been confirmed by several recent studies in other locations and by reviews of 1993/94 production and returns for key export crops by the Marketing Development Bureau. Rates of return for tobacco, coffee, tea, sugar and rice have declined in many areas of the country¹⁵, but there has also been growing regional differentiation as a result of the rolling back of support services and infrastructure for smallholder farmers. Coffee, maize, sugar and paddy will be examined here.

Women and men smallholder farmers reported increasing difficulty to sustain farm production and take care of their families during the 1990s, according to recent micro-level research and a recent overview of women and agriculture.¹⁶ Women, in particular, reported having to intensify their labour in market-oriented activities, as self-employed farmers, traders, and artisans, as unpaid family labour in both export and food crop production, as casual and permanent labour in farming and nonfarming, and as unpaid family labour in reproduction and maintenance of the household, family and community. Levels of income have not kept up with increased work, for women or men. However, women face the compounded problem of having to depend on the good will of household heads in insuring that they benefit, directly or indirectly, from their labour input, especially on export crop farms. This has acted as a major disincentive towards increased labour input in export production, and undoubtedly has had a negative impact on total farm output at household and national level.

People’s subjective views are backed up by recent studies, including the 1993/94 marketing and industrial reviews carried out by MDB, which documented falling returns for their labour in farming, both in food crop and export crop cultivation. This section will focus on quantitative analyses of rates of returns to labour carried out mainly by MDB, and their reanalysis by Msambichaka and Naho (1995: Table 2.17 and 2.18).

The *main findings on trends since SAP (post-1986)* are that:

1. producer prices show minimal or no increase in real terms for most of the post-'86 period
2. low share of producer price and domestic sale price goes to the farmer
3. farm inputs prices grow faster than producer prices

¹⁵Kimambo 1994, Majengo 1994, Mdadila 1996, Mwaikambo 1995, Toke 1995, also Turuka 1995 and Kashuliza and Mbiha 1995.

¹⁶ See Kashuliza and Mbiha 1995, Koda 1994ab, Mbilinyi 1995b, Turuka 1995, and Ch. 5 in Mbilinyi 1997.

4. returns to labour are mixed, in many cases export crop returns are below food crop returns, or are negative
5. competition over labour, land and farm inputs between export crops and food crops has increased
6. pressure to intensify farm production (intensify labour, farm inputs, land) has increased, in tune with increasing power of market forces.
7. farmers located near major market centres or good transport lines have benefited most from reforms, whereas farmers in distant or more remote locations have not benefited.

Rates of return calculations for *coffee* had become problematic during the 1993/94 season, as a result of trade liberalisation, because of different costs of production in different regions, different crop prices, and the lack of reliable sources of information about actual prices paid to the farmer (Mwaikambo 1995).

Coffee farmers do not see any return for four years while establishing their crop, similar to tea, but the crop provides them with output for 45 years thereafter, with peak years of production during the first 15-20 years. Arabica requires about 224 labourdays, robusta 176 if interplanting (Ruvuma) and 183-204 if pure stand (Mbeya). The returns to labour for pure stand coffee ranged from 785/ to 878/ per labour day; for mixed stands in highlands, 591/ per day because of fewer trees; mixed stand Robusta in Kagera 374/ per day. Again, very different returns were realised, depending on geographical location.

There was growing pressure on farmers to intensify their exploitation of *unpaid family labour* in place of wage labour in order to reduce labour costs, and thereby offset the increased cost of farm inputs, in particular. In Mbinga, for example, farmers reduced their labour costs by combining hired labour and *family labour*, where the number of paid labour days was reduced from 209 to 102, and hence got higher returns (878/ per kg). In the Northern zone where coffee was interplanted with banana and other crops, if growers only used family labour, they got much higher returns to labour, ranging from 591/ to 925/ per kg. Mbeya returns remained low (785/ per kg) because of low prices paid by the Mbeya cooperative unions.

These calculations reveal the *significance of unpaid family labour for the sustainability of smallholder export crop production*. Without *unpaid largely female, child and youth labour*, coffee, for example, would not be an economic crop for smallholders to grow. The premises upon which these calculations were made by the market experts were not questioned -- i.e. exploitation of unpaid family labour. Moreover, it is possible that extension agents advised farmers to shift from hired to family labour so as to reduce "costs" of labour. On the other hand, the proportion of women, and men, working as unpaid family labour had declined, according to the 1988 census data, and there was evidence to suggest that young men and women were resisting this form of oppressive work by migrating away from home or seeking nonfarm forms of employment (earlier chapters). This may help explain why the output of export crops has not risen as high or as quickly as expected. Continued reliance on "free" unpaid family

labour to sustain Tanzania's smallholder farming system will be increasingly untenable. Alternative mechanisms will be needed to revitalise smallholder agriculture, while ensuring a reasonable cash income for all household members and others who work on the farm.

Coffee growers were also hit hard by rising costs of farm inputs, including labour: in Mbozi, they rose 746% to 45,667/ per ha; Arusha, rose 282% to 67,489/ per ha; and in Kagera, rose 447% to 43,134/ per ha in nominal terms. The situation would have been worse if calculations were in real prices. As in the case of tobacco, many farmers were shifting from coffee to other crops such as maize, which had higher returns. Hence, the paradox, that in some areas, farmers were shifting from coffee or tobacco to maize, whereas elsewhere, sometimes within the same district, they shifted away from maize to an export crop. These different trends reflect the different and confusing conditions faced by different kinds of farmers: women or men, rich or poor, on accessible roads near markets or far away.

A variety of explanations were given for the low returns for coffee, *in spite of, or because of, economic reforms*. They included: *declining real world coffee prices during the early 1990s; high bureaucratic and transport costs of the cooperative unions, including mismanagement (ibid:53); extremely high interest rates of 26-30% which make it nearly impossible for cooperatives to access the credit necessary for purchases of farm inputs and crops; "inflexible banking attitude" (ie market principles first); increasing real costs of farm inputs; scarcity of farm inputs; poor roads*. The farmers were squeezed between the cooperatives, on the one hand, and private traders on the other, and "are to a larger extent than ever before financing the crop operations" (p.54).

Some 1.78 million people were directly employed in coffee farm production (it is unclear, again, if this refers only to household heads, or includes the wives and children who also work on the coffee farm) and in coffee processing factories, a large proportion of whom have been women. Many other people depended on coffee indirectly for their employment as truck drivers, desk workers, road/rail employees, civil servants, distributors of inputs, extension workers and the like.

In a 1990/91 field study in Morogoro, Iring and Mbeya, involving 458 smallholder farmers in 24 villages, availability of credit for farm inputs, and availability of farm equipment and machinery for hire were considered significant factors influencing production decision by more farmers than farm gate prices and marketability - though all four items were emphasised (Kashuliza and Mbiha 1995). Farmers varied, however, according to zone and crop, because of different production and market conditions. In Morogoro, for example, where relatively few farmers used agrochemical farm inputs, more weight was given to farm machinery and farm gate prices, compared to Iringa and Mbeya, where farm inputs were key.

Although farm inputs were now available in private rural shops in many areas, the high prices compared to real crop incomes dissuaded farmers from purchasing and

applying recommended levels, which led to lower yields. In Iringa, farmers did shift from coffee to maize because of lower production costs and higher prices in the informal market, and Mbeya farmers were tempted to do the same. The costs of hiring farm implements and farm machinery for oxen or tractors had risen beyond the reach of smallholder farmers. Tractor hire charges, for example increased more than 50% in real terms during 1985/86-1989/90, "thereby squeezing out smallholder producers who could not cope with the rise in the cost of these services (ibid:67).

Another recent study by Turuka (1995) compared the impact of reforms on maize production in Songea and Moshi, Songea part of the former southern breadbasket, and Moshi being part of the new emerging grain producing centre in the north. Very different price trends were found, which helped to explain the different responses found among farmers. Of special concern was the impact of changes in prices and availability of fertilizer during 1990/91, on size of land under cultivation, price returns and output. The responses of large and small farmers also differed in each place (and normally most large farmers were male, most women farmers operated small farms). In Moshi, larger farmers devoted more land in the plains to maize production as a cash crop, whereas in Songea, they devoted more land to tobacco as the cash crop.

Outputs were negatively affected by the increased cost of fertilizer (Moshi, Songea) and the increased unavailability (Songea) as a result of trade liberalisation and the declining role of cooperatives. Farmers in both places used lower units of fertilizer than recommended, and spread it out more with increasing farm size. Hence, lower yields were found on larger farms. Fertilizer prices increased dramatically during the period of 1990-1991 (a 184% increase in Moshi, 223% in Songea), bringing them near official prices in Moshi but *higher than official prices* in Songea because of distance, unavailability and *imperfect market conditions*. In general, Southern Highlands farmers reportedly paid 30-40% above recommended prices for fertilizer (ibid:127). Returns to labour were much higher in Moshi than Songea in 1991 (Tshs 480/ and 235/70 respectively), using open market prices, with 172% and 258% rise from 1990 returns, respectively.¹⁷

According to the 1994/95 market review for paddy (Mdadila 1996), returns varied from Tshs 382/ in Senerema and 429/ in Kahama (where farmers use animal drawn oxen), to 1034/ in Morogoro, 1498/ in Kisarawe and 1704/ in Kyela. The main reason for higher returns in the top three areas is higher prices because of their closeness to markets for rice. In 1994/95, labour charges in Morogoro were calculated to be Tshs 10,000/, and the major input cost was for seeds (Tshs 72,000/ per ha), with an expected output of 16 bags per ha (ibid:40). Another 4800/ would be spent on sacks for each ha, and with other items, the total cost per ha was expected to be Tshs 88,400/ - a sizable sum, even now, as the Lusanga and Mbogo views have shown. Information received in 1997 suggests that production costs have increased considerably. Tractor hire was relied upon by some, and

¹⁷ Lyatuu 1994 also found similar responses among farmers, who reduced their levels of fertilizer use because of inadequate credit sources, while implementing other forms of improved farm practices which had low capital costs.

cost up to 15,000/ for virgin soil, and 10,000/ for other land. Labourers using the hoe would cost 10,000/ for cultivation and planting, without the tractor. Weeding costs, using hired labour, were estimated to be 12-15,000/ per ha. plus food. Expected outputs ranged from 10-12 sacks per acre, 15-25 in some places. In Mbogo, they expected to produce 8-12 bags per ha., earning roughly 50,000/ net without costing the labour of household heads and members.

Lusanga relatively well-off farmers complained about their loss of a market in Dar es Salaam, due to cheap imported rice. These were farmers who were accustomed to store their paddy until the prices went up, during the hungry season, and then transport it to Dar for sale. Poorer farmers were forced to sell their crop soon after harvest so as to meet cash needs. The price differentials were substantial: currently a sack of paddy sold for 5-6000/ during May-August, went up to 10-16,000/ in Sept-Oct, and could reach 20,000/ in December-January. Another villager talked about the rich-poor divide: "You'll find one farmer producing two ha of paddy, and getting 16 sacks, while someone else farms 100 ha. Both of them are supposed to compete in the same market. You can tell that it's a matter of one finishing off the other. The one with 16 sacks will sell 10, remain with maybe 3, he has no profit and no food!" Several village leaders and farmers in Lusanga and Mbogo called for a more active role of government in protecting producer prices, ensuring a market for crops, and supporting the development of other cash crops with higher returns. At the same time, they noted the need for farmers to create their own associations to protect their interests, first by setting a floor price for crops, below which no farmer should agree to sell her/his crops.

Sugarcane has become a significant smallholder and commercial farm crop, grown by outgrowers on a semi-contractual basis with the large sugar companies, as noted above. Services and inputs that the companies provide on a loan basis are recovered by payment deductions at the time of sale to the company. Normally it takes 14-16 months to begin harvesting the first crop after planting, but thereafter the crop continues to produce for many years, with yields up to 30 tons per ha. around Kilombero. According to MDB estimates in the 1993/94 season (Toke 1995:13-14), outgrowers experienced a loss of about Tshs 17,550/ per ha. during the first harvest, but realised about Tshs 39,750/ returns per ha thereafter. Their production costs per ha. included Tshs 23,850/ for weeding, 6000/ for fertilizer, and additional charges for cane cutting 10,500/ , loading 5250/ and transport of 41,790/ [provided by the company]. In addition, 30% interest was charged on the "loan" or capital invested by the company, giving total production charges of Tshs 130,791/ per ha., a substantial capital investment, beyond the means of most smallholder farmers we talked to in the Mtibwa area, in any case.

Outgrowers reduced their costs considerably by *using unpaid family labour instead of hired labour*, as noted by Toke (ibid:13): "Some of the operations which outgrowers use their family labour include furrowing, planting, part of weeding, and fertilizer application." As discussed above, outgrowers sugarcane production has expanded around Mtibwa, and Kilombero as well. A growing number of farm households and their members have become absorbed into the sugar industry, on highly exploitative

terms from the point of view of unpaid family members, i.e. wives and daughters, as well as sons and other family members.

The land question was emphasised by local villagers in the area surrounding Mtibwa Sugar Estates, as found elsewhere in Tanzania, and will be discussed below.

LAND

Landlessness has become a real issue in Tanzania, defined both as absolute landlessness, and inadequate land so as to provide for basic needs (in kind and cash).¹⁸ Those most vulnerable to landlessness are young women and men ('youth'), divorced women, widows, and poor households.¹⁹ Research indicates a decline in farm size under cultivation, at least in some areas (Turuka 1995). The majority of smallholder farmers in Tanzania own less than one acre, many farm in semi-arid conditions or on soil which is not fertile, and in once fertile areas, the land is over-farmed with inadequate fallow and rotation periods because of land pressure and the market pressure to intensify farming so as to increase cash proceeds (Abdallah 1996 on Kondo, Mvungi 1995 on Mwangi).

Women are the most disadvantaged when it comes to land (Omari 1995), but it is essential to place gender in the context of *growing class polarisation* in the countryside. Morogoro regional and district authorities reported several sites of land conflict in rural areas: a large farmer has sought 20,000 acres of land in one case (thus far, denied), and local villagers have protested and demanded land fragmentation of large farms elsewhere. In the Mtibwa field study, villagers in Lusanga and Mbogo spoke bitterly about the way that village land was being purchased by big outgrower sugar cane farmers, so much so that they and their children and grandchildren already experienced real landlessness.²⁰ In the past, one acre in Lusanga sold for Tshs 50,000/; today the price would be Tshs 100,000/ or more. Who could afford to buy land any more? Farmers with means were forced to rent land in neighbouring villages for 10,000/. Those without means? A steady proletarianisation process has occurred in the villages surrounding Mtibwa Sugar Estates. The opening up of land to market forces is occurring side by side with the growing expansion of a labour market. In the words of several outgrowers: "You buy a plot and the people living on the plot". What do you mean? "You buy the plot. The next day, you find the farmer on your doorstep. What is it? "You bought my farm, didn't you? How am I going to eat? You bought me as well." Villagers told us the same, from the perspective of the "purchased".

¹⁸ See HakiArdhi workshops, TAWLA, Mhina 1996, Mvungi 1995, Chapter 4 above on Mtibwa.

¹⁹ Manju's (1997) paper provides especially stark account of the way that women are dispossessed of their rights to land -- and labour of their children -- when widowed, especially if they are known to be HIV/AIDS infected.

²⁰ Richard Mabala brought my attention to the land issue in Mbogo Village, and shared preliminary reflections from his recent Mtibwa research, which is highly appreciated.

In Zanzibar, market pressures on the land have increased with the reform process, and led to growing land insecurity. The majority of farm households (67%) in a recent 1994 study (Khamis 1995) had only secondary rights to land; that is, they could only plant nonpermanent crops, but not permanent trees such as coconut or clove trees, the major export crops of the islands. The land they farmed was rented, borrowed or a seasonal allocation from government, but not fully owned by themselves. An increasing portion of good farm land was being bought up by land speculators and hotel companies, to cash in on the tourist boom.

Young men in Songea Rural, Mbeya Rural and Kondoa Rural Districts spoke bitterly in 1995, 1996 and 1997 about their lack of access to land, because 'wazee' refused to handover the land to youth, or sold it or rented it to big farmers.²¹ For example, villagers in Ilongo ward, Mbeya Rural, explained how individuals and groups rented out their land to rich farmers for 10,000/ per acre. Land pressures have pushed up the rent level, beyond the reach of local women who have depended on land rentals or 'loans' in the past, because they lacked 'normal' inheritance rights. Inroads were being made into village land, not just land on the outskirts of village boundaries, but within (Chale and Mukangara 1997).

Gender and Land

According to Agricultural Sample Surveys carried out over time by the BOS, average planted area of smallholder farmers (in hectares, i.e.ha.) has increased with fluctuations from 0.74 ha in 1986/87 to 0.91 ha in 1994/95. The lowest average holding during this period was 0.63 ha in 1990/91. The farm holdings of male and female household heads have been disaggregated (along with many other factors of production - the NSCA is among the most gender-aware official statistics available in Tanzania), and confirm gender inequities in land 'ownership'. Women heads consistently farmed smaller landholdings than men (Table 2), and the *gender gap increased* during the period. Women planted land in 1986/87 was 66% of that of men; 61% in 1987/88; 67% in 1990/91 and down to 64% in 1994/95.

The youngest farmers (15-24 and 25-34 years) had the smallest planted landholdings, averaging 0.70 and 0.77 ha respectively., compared to 0.93-0.98 ha for heads 35 years and above (NSCA 3:T.1-15). Farmers with the smallest plots also had the smallest households: one person households farmed 0.55 ha., households with 2-5 persons farmed 0.74 ha, households with 6-10 persons farmed 1.06 ha on the average, and households with 11-15 persons and 16+ persons, respectively, farmed 1.64 and 2.31 ha (ibid:T.1-14). In other words, households which were land poor were also labour poor, since larger households tended to have more household members who worked on the farm (ibid).

²¹ TGNP 1996 'National Report on Voter Education' Dar es Salaam, Chale and Mukangara 1997, proceedings of TGNP feedback workshops on Intermediate Gender Networks in 1996, 1997.

Table 2 Planted Area of Holding ('000 ha) by Gender of Farm Holder/Head

Sex	1986/87		1987/88		1989/90		1990/91		1994/95	
	Plantd	Ave.	Plantd	Ave.	Plantd	Ave	Plantd	Ave	Plantd	Ave.
Male	2607	.89	2660	.93	2262	1.1	2474	.73	2954	.97
Female	353	.59	280	.57	608	.74	381	.53	394	.62
Totl	2960	.74	2940	.75	2870	.92	2855	.63	3348	.91
%F of Total	12%		9.5%		21%		13.3%		11.8%	

Source: 1994/95 = NSCA3:T.1-16; all other years from Koda 1994:T.5.3, original source Agricultural Sample Surveys, BOS.

Male farmers were overrepresented among the farmers of one or more ha (30% of men heads and 17% of women heads), and women were overrepresented among those farming 0.30 has and less (34% men, 43% women), as shown in calculations presented in Table 3. Some 72% men and 84% women farmed 1 ha or less, i.e. the national average, which is too small to be a viable farm unit according to agricultural experts we consulted.

Table 3 Heads of Household by Sex and Size of Planted Area - Mainland
[in %]

Size of planted area	Male	Female
without planted area	5%	4%
0.01-0.10	9	12
0.11-0.20	11	14
0.21-0.30	9 [29%]	13 [39%]
0.31-0.40	8	11
0.41-0.50	7	9
0.51-0.60	6	6
0.61-0.70	5	4
0.71-0.80	5	5
0.81-0.90	4	4
0.91-1.00	3 [38%]	2 [41%]
1.01-1.50	12	9
1.51-2.00	6	3
2.01-5.00	10	4
5.01 +	2 [30%]	1 [17%]
Total	101%	101%
Total Households	3872324	661868
%F of Total		17%

Source: Author's calculations from NSCA3: t. 1-13A

Micro-level research confirms these findings, also document how women - both married and unmarried - endeavour to access and sometimes control land in their own right. In her recent study of 97 women farmers in Morogoro region (three villages in Morogoro Rural and two villages in Kilosa), Rwambali (1990) found a variety of ways in which women accessed land. Some 35% held land in their own right, 15% farmed their husband's land, 25% farmed land held jointly by husband and wife, and 25% farmed land

which belonged to relatives or neighbours. In the latter case, they received land from neighbours in exchange for providing labour service on their neighbour's farm. Some 60% had direct access to land; 62% of married women had direct access - in other words, female headship did not necessarily correlate with having more access to land. Some 72% farmed land averaging 2 has. or less, 19% 2-4 has, and the remaining 8% farmed 4-8 has. Her sample was therefore on the upper end of the national range, but reflects conditions in Morogoro, where land is relatively plentiful. Indeed, women reported that land scarcity was not an issue. Instead, the problem was adequate capital to open up new land, and the long distances between house and field for allocations women received from village governments. The majority of these women farmers produced maize (70%) and paddy (28%), two major food and cash crops in the region, but only 17% mentioned cotton, a typical export crop dominated by men, and hardly any mentioned sugar cane.

Mwanyika (1993) contrasted forms of land acquisition for women and men household heads in Mbozi District, Mbeya. All male heads inherited land from their fathers, and 38% acquired additional land by purchase, and 72% from village governments. None of the female heads inherited land from relatives. Some 57% purchased land, and 43% acquired it from village government (ibid;51). These findings confirm the fact that 'customary law' systematically discriminates against women and deprives them of control over the land they farm as daughters, wives, sisters, mothers. At the same time, these and other studies (eg Omari 1995) document the steps being taken by women to acquire land in their own right. Their actions are transforming patriarchal relations and empowering women.

Gender differences were also found in crop 'choice'. Some 88% of male heads grew coffee -- none of the female heads grew coffee. Everyone grew maize and beans, but women's average hectarage was smaller (0.6 ha. women, 1.1 ha. men maize; 0.4 ha., 0.7 ha. beans) - (Mwanyika 1993:58). In no case were women's farms larger than men's, even for crops traditionally considered to be women's domain, but they were usually equal (eg. cassava, sweet potatoes, groundnuts, bananas). Women also reported leaving part of their farms uncultivated because of the *high cost of farm inputs*, especially for maize production.

A systematic male bias was found in the distribution, training, access and control over all other key resources such as credit, farm inputs and equipment, transport equipment, and information (see Mbilinyi 1997 for data and references). Women household heads were especially disadvantaged with respect to credit, information and transport, but less difference was found among women and men heads in their access to farm inputs/equipment. For example, according to the 1994/95 National Sample Survey of Agriculture (Vol.3:31-32), 12% female heads and 15% male heads used chemical fertilizers and 13% and 19% female and male heads respectively used pesticides, insecticides and herbicides. On the other hand, these women and men represent a minority of more wealthy farmers who are able to afford agrochemical inputs, while the

*majority of women and men farmers cannot. Lacking the means to increase farm yields, the poor will become poorer, until they are driven off the land.*²²

CONCLUSIONS

Key issues that have emerged during the course of this study are presented in this chapter, along with potential directions for further research and analysis and recommendations.

The Impact of SAP

The outcomes of reform policies have been mixed in terms of overall agriculture performance, with positive and negative consequences for women farmers and workers and other self-employed persons. Summaries of specific reform elements and their outcomes are presented in the form of a matrix in Tables A and B below. Table A refers to general social consequences, and Table B to gender consequences. Space has been left for participants/readers to add their own observations. The matrices reflect worst case scenario, from the perspective of low income working people. Clearly a minority of the population has benefited from the changes which have been occurred in Tanzanian rural society. Moreover, gender relations have been transformed with increased economic power for women, resulting from their increased labour force participation. This has accompanied the tragedy of falling male employment and the decline in male incomes that has been found in many locations.

It is difficult to disentangle specific outcomes of SAP from a general process of globalisation i.e. increasing incorporation of the people and society as a whole into the global market, under the domination of transnational corporations and imperial political forces. To that extent, SAP and other reform processes have accelerated a long term process in the development of capitalist relations. Many of the outcomes noted fit this analysis.

Smallholder Farming at Risk

The findings of this study confirm that smallholder farming, at least as it exists today, is at risk:

- the growing dependence on nonfarm incomes for household subsistence;
- the increasingly part-time nature of farming;
- the increasing withdrawal of family labour from smallholder farming for a variety of reasons (including women/youth resistance against unpaid family labour systems);
- the migration of youth and women away from the household farm;

²² Alternative organic techniques to increase soil fertility and protect crops against diseases and pests do exist, indeed, many are indigenous practices, but these are not being promoted on a mass scale, are sometimes labour-demanding in a context of labour shortage, and may require access to livestock.

- the increasing monetary costs of farm production and dependence on tradable goods and services such as farm inputs/equipment;
- the increasing landlessness or marginalisation in land ownership, especially among youth, the poor and women;
- the increasing orientation of farming towards non-food export crops;
- the increasing concentration and control over key resources (land, labour, farm inputs/equipment) by largescale capitalist enterprises, and the corresponding marginalisation of smallholder farmers;
- the shift in orientation of state services in support of largescale capitalist ventures rather than smallholder farming.

Table A: Structural Adjustment and its Consequences Thus Far - A Summary

<i>SAP</i>	<i>Social Consequences</i>
1. increased role of market forces	blocked by imperfect markets; but increased market value given to land, increased differentiation and concentration of land holdings; increased income gap
2. devaluation of national currency	increased cost of farm inputs and consumption items
3. increased bank interest rates	declining access to credit for poor smallscale farmers (the majority), women, cooperatives
4. cost-sharing in social services	increased costs of schooling reduces access; declining utilisation of modern health facilities
5. abolition of producer price support systems	declining food producer prices in remote/distant locations leads to falling output; better off farmers switch to export crops; increased prices and returns in northern and western zone stimulates increased output
6. abolition food consumer price subsidies	increased household food insecurity among poor rural households
7. abolition farm input subsidies	increased cost of farm inputs, decreased use, declining yields and outputs overall of food and export crops in many areas
8. increased producer price levels (crops)	stagnancy/decline in real price levels; stagnancy/ decline in export crop outputs; reduced export earnings
9. increased producers' share of world crop prices	remains low due to inflation, devaluation (which increase transport and other costs of marketing) and incomplete restructuring of market systems
10. retrenchment	increased unemployment, especially of men; with no employment strategy to assist; increased burdens on women
11. tight budget management	decline of agriculture extension and other farm support services (see also #10)
12. trade liberalisation & market restructuring	increased regional and class differentiation in crop returns, control over land, farm inputs/equipment, credit and other resources

Many of the tendencies noted by Bryceson and Howe (1995) in their analysis of the "de-agrarianization" process have been found in this study, including barriers to the full implementation of SAP or to viable development strategies. For example, imperfect

markets interfere with the development process as designed by the policy-makers. Economic diversification is happening, vis the increased significance of nonfarm activities, but infrastructural problems and low rural purchasing power inhibit rural industrialisation. Nontraditional crops may not be viable because of their reliance on high capital costs, special cultivation skills/knowledge, and efficient transport systems.

Table B: Structural Adjustment and its Consequences Thus Far - A Summary

<i>SAP & Its Effects</i>	<i>Gender Consequences</i>
1. increased nominal producer prices	women farmers do not benefit equally or at all; therefore no incentive to increase labour input and output
2. increased cost of farm inputs	decreased access to farm inputs/equipment for women
3. increased cost of consumer goods	increased female poverty
4. trade liberalisation	increased (self) employment opportunity; loss of assured markets for food crops
5. fiscal austerity measures	decreased access to credit due to high interest rates, 'hard' procedures such as collateral
6. increased market value of land	increased landlessness; increased rental/price rates beyond the reach of most women and youth in many areas
7. increased intensification of farming to meet rising consumption/production costs	increased female work burdens in production; increased female and child labour in farm and nonfarm activities
8. increased pressure to earn cash	declining household food security; food stores sold for cash; especially harmful for women, the "providers"
9. increased nonfarm activities at household & community level	decreased availability of family labour for farming
10. increased rural-rural and rural-urban migration, esp. of youth	decreased labour supply for farming; delayed marriage; increased % female-headed households
11. switch from food to industrial export crops as main cash crop *	declining household food security, as more land devoted to non-food crop; increasing gender conflict over control of labour, land and crop proceeds
12. switch from industrial to food crop as main cash crop *	increasing gender conflict over control of food crop and female labour

* Depending on location, crop switching may move in either direction, from food to industrial crop, or industrial crop to food crop. Each will have an impact on gender relations in the farming system.

On the other hand, the results do not necessarily connote de-agrarianisation, but rather, a *transformation of class and gender relations in agriculture production*: the growing immiseration of the majority of rural people, the collapse of viable commercial smallholder farming (or peasant farming by another name), and the entrenchment of largescale capitalistic agriculture enterprise which relies on extremely exploitative forms of labour organisation - made possible by the quantity of surplus labour available.

believed that the government had an active role to play in supporting efforts to stop male violence against women and children.

At the same time, farmers talked about the need to organise themselves so as to protect their control over village land and the commons around it. Joint action was also recognised as necessary to create a bottom floor to producer prices, below which farmers would not sell, thereby protecting their farm incomes from the inroads of private traders. TPAWU/ MWEMA is a good example of initiatives being taken by women workers to organise themselves.

A strong democratic activist state and a multi-layered civil society consisting of many different kinds of organisations -- these are both vital building blocks of democratic society. All citizens should have a voice in deciding about macro-level policies such as SAP, as directly as possible. Concrete mechanisms need to be put into place to enable people, at local level on up, to decide, for example, what kind of land reform they prefer, and how national revenue should be allocated between different sectors of government (the budget process). Economic literacy programmes can help to build analytical capacity, so as to be able to make informed decisions about macro policy. Gender activists can contribute their analytical skills to this popular education process, along with advocacy and lobbying for desirable policies at all levels of society. As Mtibwa workers said, "*We don't have to agree with the World Bank about everything!*" A healthy dialogue is needed, involving all stake-holders, so as to ensure that rural communities thrive and transform themselves in the twenty-first century, with justice, equity and peace.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Women and men, through their community and nongovernmental organisations, to lobby for *increased voice in decision-making concerning macro-level policies*, with special attention to economic and financial policies, so as to ensure that these are in their own best interest; and governments and donors to give more attention and respect to the concerns of working people -- civil society is more than private business.
2. Immediate steps taken to *increase real producer prices, reduce real costs of farm inputs/equipment, if necessary by means of subsidies, and provide necessary support systems* to ensure the viability of "efficient" smallholder farm systems which are organised in a nonoppressive way (i.e. providing an adequate cash income to all family workers and other producers); workers/farmers coalitions to lobby with a gender perspective.
3. NGOs and community organisations to strengthen their coalition work to lobby for a more democratic process of *land reform*, Parliamentarians to protect the rights of the majority of their constituents who are smallholder farmers and livestock-keepers,

Economic measures would thereby have created the kind of profitable conditions which depended in the past on colonial or apartheid systems of social organisation.

The alternative? The gender relations which underlie the patriarchal farming system are no longer tenable - women and youth have voted with their feet and with their hands - "we will be unpaid slaves no more!" Organisations which seek people-centred sustainable development strategies will have to confront the enormity of the oppression and exploitation that maintains the so-called "community" in rural Tanzanian society, and join forces with women and youth in creating entirely new forms of household/community structures. What kind of sustainable development strategies can be developed with the resources at their disposal, right now, which depend on local initiative, can be managed democratically by women and men, old and young, and provide dignified livelihoods for women and men on an equal and equitable basis.

Research Strategies

Many questions have emerged during this study, that cannot be answered without further study of the available literature, and by in-depth research. Nearly all of the research reports consulted were one-off studies. Long-term time series data is needed, to be able to discern real changes in market conditions, farmer responses, employment patterns and gender relations. More work needs to be done to analyse the impact of SAP and to create viable development alternatives with local communities, targeting specific interest groups, such as women, youth, pastoralists, landless groups, and casual farm workers. Action-oriented participatory research can become part of a programme to build organisational capacity at the local level, thereby equipping communities and groups to face the challenges ahead in a more proactive manner.

Take Reproduction Seriously

The capacity of the household and the community to reproduce themselves has been seriously undermined. The decline of public social services has become a politically explosive issue, and yet, the government and other development agencies have not taken decisive action to reverse the trend and provide high quality, accessible education, health and water services to all citizens. The rural areas continue to be neglected, with negative consequences for all. Health epidemics know no boundaries. Participatory democracy depends upon a well-educated and enlightened citizenry. These are efficiency arguments, however. Access to quality health, education and water services is a basic human right, that ought to require no justification.

Activist State and Civil Society

Village farmers and plantation workers who participated in this study shared a common vision of an activist state, which would protect their interests vis-a-vis company management and the vagaries of the market. Parents accused the government for its failure to develop an employment strategy which would ensure that their children had something meaningful to do, and the means to maintain themselves. Women were angry with official neglect in ensuring that men carried out their parental responsibilities. Plantation workers were especially alarmed about the increase in child abuse, and

and the government to listen to the will of the people, facilitate a democratic debate on land reform, and ensure that the final land bill empowers the community, and women, youth, pastoralists and other disempowered people in particular.

4. Government to enact and implement a *full (self)employment strategy*, with special focus on women and youth in rural areas; donors and the private sector to support; NGOs and CBOs to support information dissemination, capacity building and lobbying at all levels; to include support for nontraditional farm and nonfarm activities, increased value-added industrial processes, and innovations in technology in production and reproduction activities.
5. Immediate steps taken to *raise the minimum wage*, and adjust other wages accordingly, in line with inflation, in rural and urban areas, on the mainland and Zanzibar, workers/farmers coalitions to lobby with a gender perspective.
6. Immediate steps taken to *improve road and off-road transport in rural areas, so that women in the 21st century are freed of the bondage of headloads*.
7. Immediate steps taken to *provide "free" basic education, health and water services, especially in rural areas*, as a basic human right and a means to reduce rural-urban migration; the relatively low costs incurred to be met by reductions in administration and military expenses, and increased taxation of large companies and corporations.
8. Immediate steps to *support grassroots initiatives to develop people-centred sustainable development strategies*, using local resources, manageable and doable in an equitable and just way; NGOs and CBOs to facilitate community-based action-oriented participatory research and education programmes
9. Immediate steps to support *specific women's employment and training programmes in rural areas*
10. Immediate steps to support *institution-building and capacity building of local organisations in the rural areas*, focusing on women, youth, landless, pastoralists, the poor and other disempowered groups.
11. Strengthen *labour union organising* on plantations, commercial farms and small farms, with specific attention and organising by women, youth, casual farm workers; employers to improve working conditions and raise wages to a livable standard; government to protect the rights of farm and other workers to organise themselves.
12. Specific steps taken to remove discriminatory regulations and practices in employment (and associated institutions such as education) which oppress women by government and the Parliament, by means of legal steps to *make all forms of gender discrimination illegal*; NGOs and CBOs to facilitate women and men at the

grassroots level to lobby local authorities and MPs for the same; broad coalition be set up to lobby and mobilise the public.

13. Specific steps taken by the government and the business sector *to protect domestic industry/business* in all sectors, including agriculture, with a focus on those with progressive industrial relations and “best” practices from a gender perspective; broad coalition to be formed to lobby for a strong inward- and regional PanAfrican-oriented economy.
14. Immediate steps taken to develop *indicators of gender equity/equality* in employment, education and other arena by NGOs with the support of donors and government; government, donors and private sector to implement the same.
15. Immediate steps taken to develop a *gender review strategy* by government, donors and NGOs, indicating concrete objectives, activities, actors, timeframe, monitoring indicators and budget; gender reviews of policies in all sectors to be implemented, forthwith, and no new policies, programmes or projects to be adopted which do not pass the gender review.
16. Immediate steps taken by the *government to take a more proactive role* in negotiations with World Bank, IMF and other donors, keeping the interests and rights of the majority of its citizens in mind; *a coalition of NGOs and CBOs formed to monitor macro level policy-making* by government, World Bank, IMF and other donors, and lobby for sustainable development strategies (see above).
17. Immediate steps taken by the government *to monitor and regulate market conditions and private sector activities*, balancing the needs and rights of consumers, workers and farmers with those of private business and traders.
18. Immediate steps by agriculturalists to *develop smallscale labour intensive low cost farming systems* which are ecologically sound, environmentally friendly, job creating, low forex consumption, under local control and initiative, in place of largescale capital-intensive mechanised farming systems, which are not sustainable, not economic and endanger the environment and economic wellbeing of local communities.
19. Immediate steps taken to provide *micro credit* to rural farmers, artisans, traders, transporters and others, with a special focus on rural women and youth, in all regions, districts and villages.

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